This paper examines the role of cultural distance in the choice of the destination market for crosslisting. Cultural distance represents a measure of the differences in cultural values, norms and beliefs between two groups. We argue that firms will choose to list in more culturally similar markets to avoid potential conflicts with cultural disparate investors and managers, and as investors may be unwilling to invest in firms from culturally dissimilar markets. Employing Hofstede's (2001) Cultural Dimensions as our main cultural framework, we find strong support for the hypothesis that firms from developed markets show a greater propensity to cross-list in a country with similar values to their home market. These results are robust to a range of alternative cultural measures including the World Values Survey, GLOBE project and the modified Hofstede's scores.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in globalisation and information technologies and the ongoing efforts to facilitate crossborder flows of capital have given investors an unprecedented ability to invest in markets and companies outside of their own. Yet firms continue to list in other markets, incurring significant listing and ongoing costs in the process, such as complying with foreign listing rules. The incidence of cross-listings, firms listing their shares on multiple exchanges outside of their home market, has provoked research into several unanswered but interlinked questions. First, why should firms continue to list in other markets when investors have the ability to invest across borders (Doidge et al, 2004 and , and second, once a firm has decided to cross-list, what drives the choice of host market (Pagano et al, 2002; Sarkissian and Shill, 2004) . Numerous theories have been proposed to explain the firms' motivation in cross-listing, and as a consequence the choice of destination markets, although none offer complete explanations for the behaviour observed (see Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000 , Merton, 1987 , Foerster and Karolyi, 1998 , Doidge et al, 2004 , Fuerst, 1998 and Sarkissian and Schill, 2004 .
The idea that there is one determinant of the cross-listing decision is disputed by the findings of Bancel and Mittoo (2001) who show that managers can have a variety of potential reasons for crosslisting. One potential explanation that has been largely overlooked to date is culture. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) , the only paper to consider culture to date, look at a number of proximity measures, including cultural proximity measured with common language and colonial ties. However, as noted by De Jong and Semenov (2002) , measuring culture based on common language or shared religion lacks detail about the true differences and can often be arbitrary. Therefore, in this paper we explore the role of cultural distance within a richer cultural framework than employed in Sarkissian and Schill (2004) , specifically the Hofstede (2001) cultural dimension scores.
There is a growing awareness of the importance of culture in financial decision making. However, while culture has been used as a determinant of a number of financial decisions, the role of differences in cultural has been examined only scarcely in the financial literature. Specifically, studies have shown that the cultural distance, a measure of the differences between cultures, has been used to explain the size of the flow of both debt (Aggarwal et al. 2012 ) and equity (Siegel et al. 2010 ) capital between countries, long-run performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Chakrabarti et al, 2009 ) and extent of home bias (Beugelsdijk and Frijns 2010) . These papers all conclude that capital flows between countries that are more culturally similar are greater than those between countries that are cultural dissimilar. Crosslisting, in effect, represents another form of cross-border capital flow, albeit, one where the company itself makes its shares available to foreign investors.
In line with the aforementioned papers, we argue that cultural distance is an important determinant in the choice of host market for several reasons. First, from the firms point of view, having investors with different social norms, beliefs and cultural values may create conflict between the shareholders and either other shareholders or managers over the direction of the company or decisions made. As a result, the firm may choose to list in a culturally similar market to avoid potential conflict. Second, investors may be unwilling to invest in companies from culturally dissimilar markets. This is potentially caused by difficulties in interpreting information where nuances and non-verbal cues differ. This adds to the information costs for investors and reduces the willingness to invest in such companies. This bias may be anticipated by firms by cross-listing firms and, when combined with the significant costs of listing, may reduce the propensity to list in culturally dissimilar markets.
We empirically investigate the role of cultural differences on cross-listing decisions by employing a dataset of cross-listings from 45 home markets to 33 host markets. In addition to the proximity measures used in Sarkissian and Schill (2004) such as geographic distance, common language, economic and industrial proximity, we use the Hofstede (2001) cultural dimension scores to calculate cultural distance between countries. We find that cross-listing activity is negatively affected by the cultural distance when the firm is from a developed market. Specifically, companies from developed markets, on average, exhibit positive cultural bias in their cross-listing decisions, i.e. tend to cross-list in less culturally distant countries. These results hold after controlling for the other potential determinants for cross listing derived from the prevailing literature. Further, the results remain unchanged when we calculate measures of cultural distance employing alternative cultural frameworks including Tang and Koveos (2008) , World
Values Survey (WVS) and GLOBE project. As a final robustness check we exclude the United States as both the home and host market, and confirm that our results remain unchanged. This paper contributes to the cross-listing literature by examining the role of cultural distance in the choice of destination market. Further developing the proximity preference argument of Sarkissian and Schill (2004) , we exploit more developed cultural frameworks such as Hofstede's (2001) Cultural Dimension scores to quantify the differences in culture between countries. Our findings demonstrate that a country's cultural values are important determinants of why companies from particular countries tend to cross-list more actively in particular host markets. Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on culture and finance by highlighting the importance of culture in corporate financing decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review literature related to international crosslisting decisions and to the role of culture in financial decisions. Then we discuss potential channels, through which culture manifest itself in the cross-listing decisions, and develop our hypothesis on the relationship between the cultural distance and cross-listing activity in section 3. In section 4 we provide description of our data and of the variables that we construct to measure cross-listing activity, cultural distance and other potential factors that affect cross-listing activity. In section 5 we report our findings from univariate analysis and multivariate regression analysis and also from robustness tests. We conclude in section 6.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The cross-listing decision
Literature investigating the decision to cross-list has highlighted considerable benefits accruing to companies depending on the choice of destination market. Specifically, there is clear evidence that crosslisting on a US based exchange results in increased access to capital, lower costs of debt and equity and improved operating performance (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al, 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Ball et al, 2009; Charitou and Louca, 2009) . As a result, firms cross-listing in the United States see positive announcement day returns and receive a valuation premium over peer companies who choose to remain at home (Miller, 1999; Mittoo, 2003; Doidge et al, 2004) . The literature on non-US cross-listings is less developed and has been largely restricted to examining price reactions and valuation premiums. Most studies have concluded non-US cross-listings do result in some positive abnormal returns (Serra, 1999; Roosenboom and van Dijk, 2009) , although all studies have concluded the magnitude of the benefits is smaller than for a US cross-listing. The evidence on valuation premiums is less conclusive with Doidge et al (2009) finding no valuation premiums and Bianconi and Tan (2010) finding positive valuation premiums. In addition, studies that have examined US firms cross-listing abroad show no benefit for US firms (Howe and Kelm, 1987; Lau et al, 1994) . Given the not inconsiderable costs associated with crosslisting of shares and the evidence of reduced benefits from non-US cross-listings, it is surprising that so many companies choose to cross-list outside the US.
A considerable number of theories have been offered to explain the source of benefits to cross-listed companies and by extension the choice of the host market. The earliest theory proposed was the market segmentation theory outlined by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) . Given investment barriers between markets, the authors argued that firm may be isolated from potential investors in other markets. Crosslisting from a segmented market therefore allows a broader base of investors the opportunity to invest, improving risk sharing and reducing the cost of capital. Evidence supporting market segmentation shows that the benefits from cross-listing are greatest for firms from the least accessible capital markets (Alexander et al., 1987; Foerster and Karoyli, 1993; Errunza and Miller, 2000) . Alternatively, Merton (1987) argues that investors are unaware of foreign stocks as a result of difficulties in collecting and disseminating information on the entire universe of stocks. By entering new markets however, the firm is able to raise its profile with a greater number of investors, expand its shareholder base and so reduce its required rate of return. Empirical investigation of the investor recognition theory has shown that firms cross-listing in the US gain media attention, analyst following and forecast accuracy and that the price reaction to a US cross-listing can be partially explained by an increase in investor base (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Bailey et al, 2006; Foerster and Karoyli, 1999) . However, the ongoing trend towards market integration and increases in information market technology imply these motivations for crosslisting should be less relevant.
In contrast, a number of theories suggest that firms will target markets that are of better quality, measured in different ways, to the home market. The liquidity theory for instance argues that firms choose to list on a more liquid market so as to reduce their bid-ask spread and thereby improve their valuation (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) . This has been supported by Foerster and Karolyi (1998) who show that firms cross-listings on the NYSE, arguably the most liquid market, have positive abnormal returns. Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999) both theorize that firms may seek to cross-list in markets with stricter investor protection laws. This legal bonding theory argues that firms seek to bond the company to higher corporate governance standards in the foreign market and so benefit from the perceived reduction in risk. Doidge et al. (2004) finds that firms listing on a major US exchange was higher than those seeking lower quality listings such as on the OTC market, which they argue supports the legal bonding theory. A similar theory, the signalling theory of Fuerst (1998) , argues that firms look for a stricter disclosure regime as a way of signalling to the market about the firm's future prospects. One weakness in these motivations however, is that they provide limited explanation for the prevalence of non-US cross-listings. The US exchanges are perceived as the most liquid markets with the strictest disclosure and corporate governance regimes, implying that cross-listing firms should target these exchanges almost exclusively. However, there the number of firms cross-listing on non-US exchanges remains high.
Another motivation that has come from surveys of managers suggests that firms choose to cross-list in markets where it benefits the corporation's global strategy (Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Bancel and Mittoo, 2001 ). This includes cross-listing in markets where peers are cross-listed to strengthen their industry position (Pagano et al, 2002) , as a way of aligning operations and financing and to improve the firms image with their global customers (King and Mittoo, 2007) . Unlike previous motivations, the argument for global strategy does not suggest a strong US bias in the destination of cross-listings. Rather, firms are more likely to initiate cross-listings in proximate markets, as firms are likely to begin expanding in close markets, either geographically, economically or culturally. This idea was extended by Sarkissian and Schill (2004) who argue that rather than seeking differences or better quality markets, firms choose to cross-list in familiar markets, what they call the proximity preference theory. In contrast to previous theories which suggest firms cross-list in markets with marked differences from the home market, Sarkissian and Schill find the choice of which market to cross-list in is determined by minimizing geographic, economic, cultural and industrial proximity. A follow up paper, Sarkissian and Schill (2009) , goes further and establishes that familiarity with the company's home market product and closer geographic proximity result in greater wealth benefits. They argue that this proximity bias in selecting a host market is driven by managers belief that investors are less willing to invest in companies that are unfamiliar to them.
A notable feature of the Sarkissian and Schill (2004) paper is the inclusion of a cultural proximity measure as a determinant of the cross-listing destination. However, this study employs a simple dummy variable that equals one if the home and host markets share either a common language or have colonial ties to measure cultural proximity. While use of common language or shared religion has been used in other studies, as noted by De Jong and Semerov (2002) these measures only capture a part of the cultural similarities between two countries. As a result, more recent approaches to examining cultural proximity or distance have relied on more sophisticated cultural frameworks which have been created to more precisely quantify the dimensions of culture within a country such as the Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores.
The role of cultural distance in business and economic decisions
A recent trend in the financial literature is to examine the role of culture on financial decision making, with on specific line of inquiry focusing on how differences in cultures between countries affect the cross-border flow of capital. Cultural distance, defined as the "sum of factors creating, on the one hand, a need for knowledge, and on the other hand, barriers to knowledge flow and hence for other flows between the home and target countries" (Barkema et al, 1997, page 427) , measures the barriers created by differences in social norms and behaviours influence financial fund flows. Specifically, lower cultural differences facilitates the flow of information, as investors are better able to interpret non-verbal and nuanced communications more accurately. Given the essential role of information in financial decisionmaking, if investors feel more comfortable about the level of knowledge and accuracy of their information they are more likely to be willing to invest in foreign firms (Huberman, 2001) . Where cultural barriers reduce the flow of information or make information more difficult to interpret, investors are more likely to avoid investing or assign greater risk premiums when assessing their investment opportunities.
The idea that culture differences will negatively affect the flow of capital between markets has been well established in the literature. For instance, Aggarwal et al. (2012) show that debt financing is greater between countries that are more culturally similar, while Siegel et al. (2010) find the same effect for equity capital. Conn et al. (2005) find that greater cultural distance reduces the abnormal returns for UK companies announcing foreign acquisitions, suggesting that the market views these acquisitions as having a lower probability of success. Finally, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) find that investors display greater home bias (invest proportionally less in a foreign market than they should) when the foreign market is culturally dissimilar. It appears therefore, based on the reasoning of Barkema et al (1997) and Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997) , that the informal barriers to information flows created by cultural differences makes investors less willing to invest in markets that are unfamiliar.
With regards to cross-listing and the choice of destination market, we see two possible channels within which cultural distance may influence managers. Of note, we see cultural distance potentially influencing both the host markets attractiveness to home market firms and home market firms attractiveness to host market investors.
One channel down which cultural distance may influence the choice of host is the attractiveness of the firm's stock to host market investors. This follows from the argument of Barkema et al (1997) and Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997) who state that cultural differences create barriers to the flow of information. This communication barrier is likely to increase the difficulty in collecting and interpreting relevant information accurately and as a result prevent investors becoming suitably familiar with the company, reducing investor willingness to invest (Huberman, 2001 ). This argument is well supported by Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) who find that investors' willingness to invest in a foreign market is negatively affected by the cultural distance. Effectively, investors were more willing to invest a greater percentage of their holdings into another market if it had a similar culture, suggesting familiarity and ease of information flows are vital factors. As a result, even where a foreign firm has chosen to list within the host market, host market investors may be unwilling to invest if it is unfamiliar.
Managers of firms contemplating a cross-listing are likely to be aware of investors' need to be comfortable with a potential investment. Managers are also equally aware of the costs of cross-listing, including costs associated with the initial listing, the ongoing requirements to comply with another markets rules and the listing fees charged by the host market exchange. If cross-listings fail to generate a marked increase in the shareholder base then the positive benefits, such as improved liquidity, reduced cost of capital and ultimately a valuation premium, are unlikely to materialise. As such, we argue that managers themselves will be unwilling to cross-list in a culturally dissimilar market for fear of being ignored by investors.
Another possibility is that managers themselves are unwilling to cross-list in culturally distant markets to avoid potential conflicts. The purpose of cross-listing, as pointed out by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) and Merton (1987) , is make a firm's shares available within the investor's home market, and so broaden the f'i'r'm's' investor base. A broader shareholder base may expose the company to shareholders who have a diverse background including different cultural values and beliefs. These different beliefs may influence the way in which they view managerial practices and decisions. Seigel et al. (2008) notes that greater differences in egalitarianism (one type of cultural distance) increase transaction costs for crossborder investments because of the impact of egalitarianism on managerial behaviour and policy-making.
Attempting to bridge differences in views will cost a firm time, energy and effort and may ultimately lead to conflicts among management and different groups of shareholders. As a result, firms may be more comfortable only cross-listing in those countries where business practices and cultural norms are relatively similar to their home market, purely as a way of reducing the risk of potential conflicts.
Therefore, we argue that the cultural distance between the host and home markets will play a key role in determining whether a company will be willing to cross-list in a given host market.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Cultural distance
One of the difficulties in examining the role of culture has been the question of how to measure it.
Early attempts within the financial literature employed proxies such as religion and common language, however, these are relatively discrete measures and fail to adequately capture the true nature of a nation's culture. A better approach has been to employ a cultural framework that measures different aspects of culture within a country. Of the available frameworks, the most commonly employed and widely cited is the Hofstede ( Based on the national scores for each of the four Hofstede cultural dimension scores we calculate the cultural distance between the host and home markets. The first measure of cultural distance was introduced by Kogut and Singh (1988) and remains popular in international business research (e.g. Chakrabarti et al, 2009; Drogendijk and Slangen, 2006; Aggarwal et al, 2012) . However, as the Kogut and Singh index has been criticised for giving equal weights to the differences in the scores on each of Hofstede's dimensions (Shenkar, 2001) , we use the Euclidean distance version of the Kogut and Singh
where I kj is country j's score on the kth cultural dimension, I ki is the score of country i on this dimension, and V k is the variance of the score of the dimension. We expect that a greater cultural distance between countries is associated with relatively smaller number of cross-listings in that market.
As a robustness analysis, we also calculate cultural distance measures based on other cultural scores using Eq. 1. First, we use cultural value indices of Tang and Koveos (2008) 
Measures of cross-listing activity
To examine the role of cultural distance on cross-listings we employ a dataset of international cross-listings containing the number of companies from 45 countries that cross-list their stocks in a sample of 33 foreign countries. The country-level data is based on individual company-level listing data obtained from the host stock exchanges. The total company-level sample includes 3,638 international cross-listings that were cross-listed in foreign markets at the end of 2006, excluding OTC and off-exchange listings and listings of investment funds. 6 We label the 45 countries where companies originate from as home countries and the 33 cross-listing destination countries as host countries. A host country is included in the sample if it hosts at least one international cross-listing; a home country is included in the sample if it contributes at least five international cross-listings.
We use three measures of country level cross-listing activity as dependent variables in our regressions. The first dependent variable examines the fraction of domestic companies from a particular home country that choose to cross-list in each host country. In essence this looks at the propensity to list in a particular host market and also the propensity for firms from that home market to cross-list at all. A similar measure was used in Sarkissian and Shill (2004) , and is calculated as the number of international cross-listings from a home country i in a host country j divided by the total number of domestic companies listed in the home country:
where CL ij is the number of cross-listings from home country i to host country j; CL ij is the total number of domestic companies listed in the home country i.
The second measure of cross-listing activity is the popularity of each host market for cross-listed frims from a particular home market. This is calculated as the ratio of the number of international crosslistings from a home country i in a host country j divided by the total number of domestic companies listed in the home country:
where CL ij is the number of cross-listings from home country i to host country j; CL i is the total number of cross-listings from home country i.
Finally, we measure the probability of cross-listing from a particular home market to each host market . We calculate this probability by employing a cross-listing dummy variable (D_CL ij ) that equals one if there are any cross-listings from the home country i to the host country j and zero otherwise.
Control variables
As we note in Section 2, numerous theories have been offered to explain the cross-listing decision. As noted in survey studies of managerial motivation, this decision may be influenced by more than one consideration. Therefore, we need to control for other potential explanations of the cross-listing decision to isolate the effect of cultural distance.
Proximity measures
While we argue that the cultural proximity between countries is a key factor in the decision to cross-list, cultural distance is likely to be correlated with other measures of proximity between countries (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004) . For example, countries may share a common language, be geographically closely located, and have similar legal systems, economic and industrial structures. To control for this potential bias, we include the measures of geographic, economic and industrial proximity employed in Sarkissian and Schill (2004) . As a measure geographic proximity, we include the log of the geographical distance in kilometers between the countries' main financial centres.
7 Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that geographic distance is negatively related to the relative amount of cross-listings in a country, while Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that investors prefer stocks of firms that are headquartered in nearby locations. Economic proximity is measured by the percentage of the home country i's export going to the host country j. Industrial proximity is measured by the correlation of industry rankings between each pair of countries.
7 Geographic distances are the distances between the major financial centres of the countries calculated "as the crow flies". Data source: the distance calculator from http://www.geobytes.com.
We also include a dummy variable for common language, defined as one if the host and home countries share a common official language. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) interpret common language as a proxy for familiarity. Also, common language may reduce informational barriers between investors of different countries. Finally, we also include a dummy for shared common law, defined as one if both countries have common law legal systems. As common law is largely restricted to current and former members of the British Commonwealth, this measure captures a shared historical background and also controls for the superior investor protection prevalent in common law countries (La Porta et al, 1998) .
Based on the proximity preference argument (Sarkissian and Shill, 2004) we expect a positive relationship between shared language, economic proximity and industrial proximities and shared common law variables and the proportion of cross-listings to a particular country. Since greater geographic distance indicates reduced familiarity between the countries, we expect this geographic distance measure to be a negative determinant of the number of cross-listings.
Fundamental differences between the host and home countries
Our second set of controls relate to other common motivations believed to influence the crosslisting decision. First, we control for the argument of Alexander et al (1987) and Errunza and Miller (2000) that firms seek to cross-list to overcome market segmentation. Higher segmentation means markets are less likely to move together, and from an investor's point of view, offers greater diversification potential. We capture the level of segmentation between different markets using the correlation between the stock market index returns of the host and home countries (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010) . We calculate the correlations using monthly Datastream Total Market index returns in local currency over the past five years (data source: Datastream). We expect a negative relationship between correlations and the extent of cross-listing activity in that market.
To control for the legal bonding explanation of cross-listing exposed in Doidge et al. (2004) , we include a variable that measures the difference in quality of the investor protection laws between the home and host markets. Legal, is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if investor protection in the host country is better than investor protection in the home country and zero otherwise. We measure the investor protection of the home and host markets using the Djankov et al. (2008) Anti-Self Dealing index. We expect a positive relationship between the improvement in legal environment and the extent of crosslisting activity.
The third common motivation we control for is the desire to seek improved liquidity as argued in Foerster and Karolyi (1998) . We control for the difference in market liquidity between the host and home markets by first calculating the market turnover ratios, defined as the value of the Datastream Total A third set of control variables relate to differences in the level of economic and financial development between the host and home countries. More economically and financially developed markets are likely to offer greater benefits to cross-listing through larger and more sophisticated investor bases and more developed financial media and institutions. We control for differences in economic development by employing Economic Development, defined as the log difference in per capita GDP in 2006 (measured in US$s) between the host and home market. Financial Development is defined as the log difference in the ratio of total stock market capitalisation to GDP between the host and home market. All values were from 2006 and in US$, stock market capitalisation values came from the WFE statistics while country GDP was collected from UN statistics division web-site. We expect that host countries with higher levels of economic and financial development relative to those of the home country attract larger number of foreign listings.
In addition, we include an emerging home market indicator to capture significant differences in motivations to cross-list by companies from developed and from emerging markets. We follow Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Bekaert et al (2003) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) to classify countries into developed and emerging markets. We have no prior expectations about the sign of the relationship between the emerging market indicator and the number of cross-listings. Table 2 presents the sample description by host country. We observe all of our sample developed markets play both host and home to firms cross-listing. By contrast, while 21 emerging markets were home to cross-listed firms, only 9 play host to cross-listed firms, and two (Peru and the UAE) are not home to cross-listed firms. In total, emerging markets only host 36 cross-listed firms out of a total of 3638, or 1%. We also observe that by the number of cross-listings relative to the host markets' number of domestically listed firms, developed markets are more popular destinations, 13.9% vs. 1.4%.
Sample description
Unsurprisingly, the United States is by far the most popular destination market for cross-listing with 1,404 cross-listings (38.6%) of the total cross-listings in the sample. However, by relative size of cross-listings to the size of the host market, Luxembourg and Netherlands stand out with percentages of 775% and 124% respectively. Spain has the lowest percentage at .1%.
As with the home markets' preference for particular host markets, we observe that host markets tend to draw their cross-listings from particular home markets. For example, all foreign cross-listings taking place in Ireland are by companies from the UK. Again, this may indicate that cultural distance between host and home countries has an effect on the distribution of cross-listings across host countries. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between the three measures of cross-listing activity, the various measures of cultural distance and our control variables. Our alternative cultural distance measures all have a positive correlation and are significant at 1% level, ranging from 0.36 to 0.62. We also observe that all four cultural distance measures are negatively correlated with the measures of cross-listing activity, and are significant for all except the World Value Survey cultural distance measure. Further, the correlations between the measures of cross-listing activity and proximity measures shared common law, language, economic proximity and industrial proximity are positive and significant at 1% level, and negative and significant at 1% for geographic distance. All the proximity measures are significantly correlated with the Hofstede cultural distance measure, particularly, the shared language with the correlation coefficient -0.39 and geographic distance with the correlation coefficient 0.16. Finally, we observe significant positive relationships between Correlation and the measures of cross-listing activity and negative correlations with the cultural distance scores.
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>
RESULTS
Univariate Analysis
As a first indication as to whether there is a cultural proximity bias in cross-listings, we compute the Local Bias (BIAS) statistics following Coval and Moskowtiz (1999) . This statistic indicates whether there is a bias towards host markets that have a closer proximity to the home market. Coval and Moskowtiz (1999) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) both apply this measure to the issue of geographic proximity, however we employ it to identify whether there is a cultural bias in the choice of cross-listing market. The BIAS-statistics for home country i is computed as follows:
where h ij is the ratio of cross-listings from home country i to host country j to the total number of crosslistings from country i; B j is the benchmark ratio of cross-listings (or the expected number of cross-listings if there were no proximity bias) to the total number of cross-listings from country i. To compute the benchmark weights, B j , we follow Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and a use the total market capitalization values of each host country as a proportion of the total market capitalization value of all countries. CD ij is the cultural distance between country i and j; and 
Including this value-weighted average cultural distance benchmark in the calculation of the BIAS-statistics controls for the fact that some countries may, on average, be more culturally distant from the rest of the world than other countries. A positive value for the BIAS statistic indicates a positive cultural proximity bias, i.e. companies prefer to cross-list shares in countries that are culturally more similar, whereas a negative statistic indicates a preference for countries that are more culturally distant.
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE>
In Table 4 we report results on the cultural proximity bias and the BIAS-statistics for each home country, where we split our sample into developed markets and emerging markets. In the first column we report the actual weighted average cultural distance per country: CD i =∑h ij d ij . We observe significant variation in the actual weighted average cultural distance, which for the developed sample ranges between 0.58 for Canada and 2.57 for Singapore, and for emerging markets between 1.03 for South Africa and 3.09
for Russia. We also note that the actual weighted average cultural distance is, on average, 1.45 for developed markets and 2.20 for emerging markets, suggesting that emerging markets generally cross-list in countries that are more culturally distant.
In the second column of Table 4 we report the benchmark cultural distance,
CD , which is the market value weighted cultural distance. Again, we observe considerable variation in this measure. The benchmark cultural distance is lowest for Australia and highest for Malaysia. On average, we note that these scores are higher for emerging markets than for developed markets, indicating that emerging markets are more culturally distant from other markets than developed markets. The third column reports the difference between benchmark and actual distance. The difference is positive for all of the developed markets, indicating that there is a positive cultural proximity bias for developed markets. The difference is negative for the majority of the emerging markets, indicating a preference of cross-listing in more culturally diverse markets for emerging markets.
The last two columns report the BIAS-statistics and the associated t-statistics. First, we note that the proximity bias statistic is positive and significant for the majority of the developed markets, indicating that there is a significant positive cultural proximity bias in the cross-listings from developed countries. Based on the BIAS-statistics this bias is highest for New Zealand (50%), Ireland (47%) and Canada (46%) and is lowest (and insignificant) for Israel, Singapore and Luxembourg (between 2 and 3%). For emerging markets we find that, while most BIAS-statistics are negative, there are only few cases where the statistic is significant. This indicates that for the majority of the emerging home markets, cultural proximity does not appear to influence the decision where to cross-list.
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE>
In Table 5 , we report the cultural proximity bias scores for host countries. The results are less consistent then the home market results in Table 4 . For the emerging market sample, we see large significant positive biases in all 9 markets, indicating that that these countries receive more cross-listings from countries that are culturally more similar. We also observe large positive BIAS statistics for most developed market companies, again, suggesting that they predominantly host firms from countries that are culturally similar. However, we observe that eight developed markets have significantly negative BIAS statistics, implying they are favoured by firms from culturally dissimilar countries. These markets appear to be large financial centres such as the United States, the UK, Germany, France and Australia or tax havens such as Luxembourg and Switzerland. Obviously, this implies that these two markets have other features that make them attractive for cross-listing. 
Multivariate Analysis
where DepVar ij is one of the three measures of cross-listing activity discussed in section 3.2: 1) ln(CL ij /DC i ), 2) ln(CL ij /CL i ); 3) D_CL. CD ij is the cultural distance between the home country i and host country j calculated as in Eq.6, section 3.1, using Hosftede cultural values scores. Control variables are defined in section 4.4: Language ij is a dummy variable equal to one if home and host country share the same language; ln(GeoDistance ij ) is the log of the geographical distance between the countries' main financial centres of the home country i and the host country j in km; EconProx ij and IndustrialProx ij are the measures of economic and industrial proximity accordingly from Sarkissian and Schill (2004) ;
CommonLaw ij is a dummy variable equal to one if both home and host country have common law as their legal origin; ln(Corr ij ) measures the correlation between the stock market index return of country i and j;
Legal ij is a dummy variable equal to one if the host country legal framework is stronger than the home country and zero otherwise; Liquidity ij is the log difference between the stock market turnover ratio of the host market j and home market i; Fin_dev ij is the log difference of the stock market capitalization-to-GDP ratios of the host country j and home country i; Econ_dev ij is the log difference of the per-capita-GDP of the host country j and home country i. As our earlier findings show marked differences between the emerging and developed market samples we include we include a dummy variable that equal to one if the home country is an emerging market, Home_EM i . Finally, in order to control for other country level factors that may influence our results we estimate Eq. 6 with host country fixed effects.
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE>
In Table 6 we report the results for Eq. 6. We split Table 6 listings between a particular host-home pair of countries. As the dependent variable is a dummy we use a Probit model to estimate a probability of cross-listing from country i to country j. For each measure of cross-listing activity we estimate Eq. 6 for the full sample and individually for just developed and emerging home markets. Table 6 presents our regression coefficients. For the full sample, we observe some significance for the predicted relationship between our measures of cross-listing activity and cultural distance. We observe significance for two of the three dependent variables (cross-listing activity as a percentage of all crosslisted home market firms is insignificant) at the 10% level. However, for the developed home countries we see strong and consistently significant negative relationship across all three dependent variables, indicating that cultural distance plays an important role in the cross-listing decision. This provides strong support for our hypothesis that firms will prefer to cross-list into a market that is culturally similar to their home market, most likely as a result of familiarity or conflict avoidance behaviours. The results for the emerging markets, however, are in line with the univariate results in Table 4 which show cultural distance does not appear to be major determinant of the destination market.
In line with prior literature, we also observe that other measures of proximity between the home and host countries affect the distribution of cross-listings and the probability of cross-listing across host countries. More specifically, shared common language, economic and industrial proximity and shared common law between the home and host countries are positive determinants of cross-listing activity between the countries, while geographic distance is a negative determinant of the cross-listing activity.
These results are in line with the findings of Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and further confirm the presence of proximity bias in corporate decision to cross-list.
For the controls for other motivations and differences in market quality, we find that correlation between stock market returns of the home and host markets is a positive determinant of the cross-listing activity. However, this is contrary to the predictions of the market segmentation theory of cross-listing.
Possibly, higher market return correlations reflect higher levels of similarity between the stock markets. In this case, the positive sign of the correlation variable suggests further evidence for the proximity preference argument, i.e. companies tend to cross-list in markets that are driven by similar factors.
Furthermore, we find contrary evidence for both the liquidity and financial development variables. Other variables are not consistently significant and suggest these motivations do not play a major role in the cross-listing decision.
Robustness Tests
Alternative measures of cultural distance
To test whether our conclusion on the role of cultural proximity in the decision to cross-list is sensitive to the choice the measure of cultural distance, we employ three alternative measures of culture, Tang & Koveos, the World Value Survey and the GLOBE project. For each cultural framework we recalculate our measure of cultural distance and re-estimate Eq. 6. Panel A of Table 7 reports the estimation results. 9 Coefficient estimates for all three alternative cultural distance variables are negative and statistically significant for developed markets sub-sample. These confirm our findings in Table 6 and show that larger cultural distance between the home and host countries results in less cross-listing activity 9 To save space, coefficient estimates of control variables are not reported but were consistent with those reported in Table 6 . between those countries. Table 7 also confirms the lack of significance of cultural distance for emerging market firms, consistent with our earlier findings.
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE>
Excluding the United States as host and home market
Given the United Stated is the most popular host country in the sample, hosting 38.5% of all crosslistings, and is an important home country, contributing 15.1% of all cross-listings, we exclude those companies with the United States as a home or host country as a robustness test. We verify that our conclusion on the role of cultural distance between countries in the cross-listing decisions is not driven by US cross-listings. Panel B of Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates for the Hofstede cultural distance variable excluding the United States as a host or as a home market. Our results remain unchanged.
CONCLUSION
This paper extends the existing literature on international cross-listings in several ways. First, we extend the work of Sarkissian and Schill (2004) by examining the concept of cultural distance and the role it plays in the choice of destination market. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) measure cultural proximity in terms of common language and colonial ties, rough proxies of culture. We exploit more developed cultural frameworks such as Hofstede's (2001) Cultural Dimension scores to more accurately quantify the differences in culture between countries. After controlling for common language and other proximity measures such as geographic distance, economic and industrial proximity and shared legal origins, and other motivations for cross listing, we confirm the importance of cultural distance. Our findings demonstrate that a country's cultural values are important determinants of why companies from particular countries tend to cross-list more actively in particular host markets. More specifically, we show that the distribution of international cross-listings is significantly affected by the differences in cultural distance between country pairs. Our results are robust to alternative measures of cross-listing activity, estimation procedures, alternative measures of cultural distance and to the exclusion from the sample of the US crosslistings. Our results also highlight a notable dichotomy between the cross-listing motivations of emerging and developed market firms. In particular, we document the cultural proximity is an important consideration for cross-listing destination for companies from developed markets but appears to be dominated by other motivations for companies from emerging markets. Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the role of culture in financial decision making. Our results highlight the importance of culture in corporate financing decisions and urge for further research in this area. 
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